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Thomas Rogers 
 
 Within the context of limited wars, the failure of the military leader 
to comprehend the political objective and the failure of the civilian 
leader to comprehend what actually can and cannot be achieved by 
force either has, or has the potential for catastrophic results. There 
are numerous examples of both in the case studies that follow. I will 
demonstrate that the civilian leader’s failure has preeminent impact—
and is the more harmful to the conduct of limited war. To mitigate 
these negative results, the military leader must require, and the 
political leader must comprehend what the military is capable of 
achieving vis-à-vis the political objectives for the war.  
  Carl von Clausewitz, the foremost political theorist on the dynamics 
of war, determined over a century ago, that politics must define the 
ultimate objectives of every war. Political objectives must also be 
adapted to the war, as the war can radically change—political 
objectives must stay within the parameters of what the military is 
capable of achieving. Clausewitz writes: 
Politics … is the womb in which war develops—where its outlines 
already exist in their hidden rudimentary form, like the 
characteristics of living creatures in their embryos, therefore, must 
define the ultimate objectives of war. That, however, does not 
imply that the political aim is a tyrant. It must adapt itself to its 
chosen means, a process which can radically change it …. War in 
general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to 
require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be 
inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small 
demand; but however much it may affect political aims in a given 
case, it will never do more than modify them. The military leader 
has the right to require, and the political leader has the obligation 
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to comprehend what the military is capable of achieving vis-à-vis 
the political objective for the war. 1 
Clausewitz believed that war was merely politics by a different means; 
and, that the use of these military means may be inappropriate for 
meeting certain political objectives.  
Great Britain attempted to defeat the uprising in the 
American colonies, initially, as a police action against certain criminals 
in Boston. As the rebellion grew in intensity, the British Crown 
eventually reacted to a small conventional force of ‘regulars’ and 
various regional militias, under General George Washington’s 
command, with a force of approximately 10,000 British Red Coats 
and a supporting Royal Navy. As this limited British response to the 
colonial insurrection continued and expanded, a long war of attrition 
dragged on. It was a limited war for the British because their goal was 
to maintain hegemony over the thirteen colonies by maintaining the 
status quo. The British Crown failed to understand their army was 
inappropriate for fighting against a combination Fabian/conventional 
war strategy devised by the Americans. This lack of understanding of 
the American resolve and strategy, and Britain’s limited objectives and 
resolve to see the war through to its positive conclusion resulted in 
Britain’s ultimate defeat. Decisions made by civilian leaders 
representing the British Crown, failed to comprehend what actually 
could and could not be achieved by the use of force, resulting in their 
defeat. A political resolution to the conflict, short of war, might have 
been far more beneficial to Britain (i.e., working out a Canada-like 
political agreement with them). 2 
The solutions to both the United States and its allies efforts in 
Vietnam, 1960s and early 1970s, and Britain’s efforts in Ireland, 
during the Anglo-Irish War, 1919-1921, might also have been better 
served by not going to war. ‘Some of the ways in which force is 
                                                 
1 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 149. 
2 Piers Mackesy, ‘British Strategy in the American War for Independence.’ The 
Yale Review, (published by Blackwell Publishers, June 1963), 539-57. 
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employed may generate counter-productive political effects.’3  
Certainly, the United States could have seen the depth of the Viet 
Minh’s resolve to attain independence through their long war with 
France. Also apparent were the Communists/Nationalists ability to 
fight both a conventional and guerrilla war. The United States’ 
political leaders could have, with an accurate net assessment of what 
was necessary to win the war, either limited their involvement to an 
advisory role, or foregone the effort altogether. A limited involvement 
was especially important, because the major theatre during the Cold 
War (and throughout the period of the Vietnam War) was always 
Europe, and because the ultimate restrictions on fighting the war 
were so stringent—in order to avoid the entry into the war by third 
parties (i.e., China or the Soviet Union).4  
President Johnson’s continued faith in the military to bring a 
satisfactory conclusion to the conflict—faith based on such incorrect 
criteria as—body count, illustrates his lack of understanding of what it 
would take to ‘win’ this war. The political leaderships’ inability to 
understand that their superior conventional force (a la Korean and 
Second World War forces) was not appropriate to fight a land war in 
Asia against such a resourceful and illusive enemy; this failure 
ultimately resulted in America’s defeat in this limited war.5  
What do statesmen need to know about the military instrument? 
Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to 
produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political 
situations influence operations for the worse. Efforts to win the war 
                                                 
3 B.A. Lee, Strategy and Policy Lecture: ‘Retrospect and Prospect,’ United States Naval 
War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2002. 
4 Harry G. Summers, Jr., ‘Defense Without Purpose,’ Society, 
November/December, 1983, 
4-17.  
5 George C. Herring, University of Kentucky, ‘Cold Blood,’ LBJ’s Conduct of Limited 
War in Vietnam, The Harmon Memorial Lectures In Military History (published by 
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado, 1990), 1-22. 
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by non-conventional means proved foreign to the United States 
Army’s nature.6   
Certainly, the solution to the Anglo-Irish War was to have 
resolved it before it began. The means by which Great Britain could 
have accomplished that was through home rule. In fact, this solution 
was contemplated and held in abeyance until after the First World 
War. Home rule provided for internal control of domestic politics, 
and British Parliamentary authority over foreign trade and foreign 
military and political relations. Because of the failure to implement 
home rule, as well as the violent response to the Dublin Uprising, the 
force necessary to defeat the Irish uprising increased over time. Once 
British force against the rebellion became brutal (with the addition of 
the Black and Tans), and Republican violent activity increased, the 
Irish public became progressively more supportive of the 
insurrection. The British public became progressively more appalled 
by the violence, and ultimately called for a limited peace. The object 
became less valuable to them than was the cost for continuing the 
war. Clearly, this case could have been resolved politically. The British 
civilian leadership did not understand that the use of military force 
through limited war could not achieve what peaceful negotiation, at 
an earlier date, could. The failure of civilian leaders to comprehend 
what actually could and could not be achieved by force in this limited 
war cost Great Britain an important geographic region and several 
million subjects, not to mention the lives lost during the war.7 
 Another question that must be asked: ‘Is the political objective 
understood or accepted by the military leader?’ If not, ‘strategy drives 
policy or the military conception of victory supersedes political 
conception.’  If military strategy is not subordinated to political 
objectives, Clausewitz maintains: ‘War cannot be divorced from 
political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the 
many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are 
left with something pointless and devoid of sense.’ ‘No other 
                                                 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 608. 
7 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and 
Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 605 & 607. 
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possibility exists, then, than to subordinate the military point of view 
to the political.’8  
There were a number of issues under dispute between 
President Truman and General MacArthur, during the Korean War, 
that directly relate to these ‘Clausewitzian’ precepts. As Theater 
Commander, during part of the Korean War, MacArthur, an 
unparalleled military strategist, disagreed with Truman’s political 
objectives for victory; maintaining South Korean independence by 
pushing back North Korean military forces above the 38th parallel, 
and the policy of ‘collective security’ within the United Nations were 
insufficient for victory. MacArthur demanded alternate courses of 
action.  
Although Theater Commanders and Presidents have differed 
in the past, MacArthur went ‘public’ on what he determined Truman’s 
strategy for defeat, and his strategy for victory were. MacArthur’s 
strategy called for bombing Manchurian airfields, blockading the coast 
of China, and employing Chinese Nationalist troops in both Korea 
and South China. He advocated this alternate military strategy, 
ostensibly because it would achieve United Nation’s ‘limited 
objectives’ more quickly, with fewer casualties, and with a better 
chance of avoiding a Third World War with China and/or the Soviet 
Union.9  
The Truman Administration believed these actions would 
have the opposite effect—that they would draw China directly into 
the conflict and possibly start a Third World War. It was MacArthur’s 
view that China would enter the war in any event.  MacArthur was 
also willing to ‘go it alone,’ or without United Nation’s concurrence if 
necessary.  The Truman Administration’s policy in Korea and 
throughout the world was not to destroy Communism, at least in the 
                                                 
8 Professor Hoyt, Strategy and Policy Lecture: ‘Strategies and Policies of 
Terrorism’, The Irish Question: 1916-1923, United States Naval War College, 
Newport, Rhode Island. February 20, 2004. 
9 Testimony of General Douglas MacArthur and of Secretary of Defense George 
Marshall in Allen Gottman, ed., ‘Korea: Cold War and Limited War,’ (published 
by D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), 26-52. 
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short term, but to contain it—to halt its expansion. With the onset of 
the Korean War, the Truman Doctrine, characterized by limited 
political objectives, was put to a long and bitter test. MacArthur 
publicly disagreed with these aims, and was relieved of his command 
as a result. In this instance, the failure of the military to comprehend 
the political objective may have prolonged the war, as American and 
other United Nations forces went beyond the 38th parallel which may 
have resulted in the Chinese entry into the war. However, Truman’s 
policies did not result in a Third World War, and China may have 
entered the war regardless of his in-theater decisions. His efforts may 
have prolonged the settlement of this limited war, but they were not 
allowed to alter its ultimate outcome—because MacArthur was 
removed, and military strategy was not allowed to supersede the 
civilian conception of victory.10  
In matching strategy and policy it is important to ask two very 
important questions before the onset of military operations; first: Is 
the policy one that can best be accomplished by military means? The 
second: Is the military’s capability understood by the civilian 
leadership? In the case of Vietnam, the Johnson Administration did 
not understand the military capability vis-à-vis what it would take to 
win the war? In the Anglo-Irish War, the British Government did not 
understand that the best solution to the Irish question was through 
peaceful means. The British faced a similar question with regard to 
the American War for Independence. These were important examples 
of the failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what actually can and 
cannot be achieved by force; and, they proved to be fatal to the 
conduct of these limited wars. Believing that they would ultimately 
succeed, if more troops were mobilized, if additional ordnance was 
delivered to their targets, etc., they pressed on even though they did 
not understand that military force in these limited wars would not 
bring about victory. 
 During the great debate surrounding the invasion of Iraq in 2002, a 
set of assumptions were made that proved to be supremely flawed, 
                                                 
10 Robert Osgood, ‘Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy,’ (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1957), 173-178. 
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and resulted in a policy-strategy mismatch. Months of planning 
focused on building a coalition for the commencement of the 
invasion, and focused almost exclusively on military operations 
necessary for the invasion and subsequent beheading of the Iraq 
Government. Little if any of the planning developed a vision of post-
war Iraq—what roles the United Nations, non-government agencies 
(NGOs), and elements of the United States, State Department would 
have. The vast majority of planning time, in fact, focused on military 
operations and how soon those operations would be completed. By 
the time President Bush announced military operations were 
ending—as if that would be the final act in this drama, events within 
Iraq made it evident that the real challenges of the war were just 
beginning. The hard reality was that once military operations were 
complete (the invasion forces were in place), the business of ‘nation-
building’ would begin.11  
 In the prophetic words of the, then, Secretary of Defense, Richard 
Cheney, February 1992, specific issues would have to be addressed 
before any political goals could be met: 
If we’d gone to Baghdad [during the First Gulf War], and got rid 
of Saddam Hussein—assuming we could have found him—we’d 
have had to put a lot of forces in and run him to ground some 
place. He would not have been easy to capture. Then you’ve got 
to put a new government in his place and then you’re faced with 
the question of what kind of government are you going to 
establish in Iraq? Is it going to be a Kurdish government or a Shia 
government or a Sunni government? How many forces are you 
going to have to leave there to keep it propped up, how many 
casualties are you going to take through the course of this 
operation? 12 
                                                 
11 Professor Karl Friedrich Walling, Strategy and Policy Lecture: ‘A Thucydidean 
Perspective, Section II. Iraq and the Sicilian Expedition Compared,’ United States 
Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, Winter 2004, 8. 
12 Charles Pope, ‘Cheney changed his view on Iraq,’ (published by the Seattle Post 
– Intelligencer Washington Correspondent, 10:00 p.m., Tuesday, 28 September 
2004). 
FJHP – Volume 29 – 2013 
15 
 Chaney understood the great challenge associated with any invasion 
of Iraq in 1992. For whatever reason, he put those concerns aside and 
supported the full blown military invasion despite his earlier 
apprehensions. In doing so he implicated himself in a serious strategy-
policy mismatch--strategy equaling the overthrow of Saddam regime 
using conventional military means; and, policy equaling withdrawal of 
all forces once a democratic government was established that 
represented all members of the Iraq society—one that could defend 
itself and its people from continuous attack and perhaps full blown 
civil war. The military overthrow was feasible; but, the 
democratization (and avoidance of civil war) was not, at least without 
a huge cost in lives and resources. The miss-match, then, caused a 
drastic rethinking of the war strategy once the military invasion came 
to an end and the need for nation building became apparent—
belatedly, as we realized no real planning had occurred regarding war 
termination. If we had completed our real homework, we perhaps 
would have made the decision not to invade Iraq in the first place. 
 Because in every case study, the ultimate decision was a political one, 
I must say that the failure of civilian leaders to comprehend what 
actually can and cannot be achieved by force is more harmful in the 
conduct of limited war. That is, even in the instance where 
MacArthur either did not understand (or disagreed) with the 
established political objectives, the civilian leadership’s view won the 
day. In the Iraq War previous decisions were over ridden, a series of 
faulty assumptions won the day, and led the United States and its 
coalition of allies down ‘primrose lane’ and a series of ill-advised 
adjustments that cost us dearly in both lives and treasure. Having 
made my decision that civilian leadership is paramount to success in a 
limited war I cannot help but feel the ultimate harm is when both the 
civilian leadership fails to understand the limitations of military 
power, and the military’s failure to understand their nation’s political 
goals of the war. For me, both the Vietnam and Iraq Wars fit this dual 
failure—although Iraq has yet to fully play out its catastrophic 
destiny. 
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